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This paper reports the findings from the Eliciting Public Preferences on Work and Health (EPPWaH) 
project, funded by the University of Sheffield Social Sciences Partnerships, Impact and Knowledge Exchange 
(SSPIKE) programme's Knowledge Exchange and Impact Opportunities (KEIO) scheme.  Research ethics 
approval was obtained at the University of Sheffield.  The online survey panel hosted by ResearchNow was 
used.  The work was carried out independently of the University of Sheffield.  We are grateful to all 
participants who took part.  Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at a Department of 
Economics internal seminar at the University of Sheffield (March 2017), a workshop at the Work and Health 
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Abstract  1 
TｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ HW;ﾉデｴ “Wヴ┗ｷIW ｷﾐ デｴW UK ｷゲ ゲWデ ┌ヮ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW ﾗa さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざが 2 
where those with identical medical needs should be given equal priority in receiving health care.  However, 3 
non-medical needs may also be relevant in health care decision-making.  This paper considers how 4 
members of the general public value access to a health service given equal medical needs, where some 5 
service users have additional non-medical needs.  There are three primary research questions.  First, are 6 
public preferences regarding access to a health care service symmetric and inequality averse?  Second, are 7 
public preferences asymmetric across different needs groups?  And third, which individual characteristics of 8 
respondents are predictive of different public preferences in this domain?  An online survey of the UK 9 
general public was conducted in January 2017 using binary choice questions.  The hypothetical scenarios 10 
involved allocating extra resources from a social perspective, to reduce the waiting time to access a mental 11 
health service for the unemployed, for the employed, or for both groups.  Based on a valid sample of 662 12 
respondents, the study found that the three main preference categories were: inequality averse and 13 
symmetric, inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, and inequality seeking and 14 
asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, ┘ｷデｴ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ HWｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉ;ヴｪWゲデく  ‘WゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲげ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ 15 
labour market status was found to explain their preferences so that those who were currently job-seeking 16 
were more likely to demonstrate preferences that favoured the unemployed, and those who were 17 
currently unemployed were less likely to demonstrate asymmetric preferences that favoured the 18 
employed. The implications from these findings are that health policies in the UK that support equal access 19 
for equal medical need are likely to be received most favourably, yet a non-trivial minority may support 20 
policies favouring those with other, non-medical needs.    21 
 22 
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1.1 Background 28 
One of the seven key principles that guide the National Health Service (NHS) in England states that 29 
さAIIWゲゲ デﾗ NH“ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ｷゲ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ IﾉｷﾐｷI;ﾉ ﾐWWSが ﾐﾗデ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ヮ;┞ざ ふNHS England, 2015a), 30 
;ﾐS デｴｷゲ ｷゲ ﾗaデWﾐ ヴWヮｴヴ;ゲWS ;ゲ さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざ ふDepartment of Health, 2017).  The principle 31 
implies that those with identical medical need should be given equal priority in receiving health care.   32 
However, while this principle rules out access based on ability to pay, it does not say anything about access 33 
based on non-medical need.  There is a large academic literature discussing what is (or should be) meant by 34 
さﾐWWSざ に but while the debate has focused on what constitutes medical need (for example, pre-treatment 35 
health status, or capacity to benefit; see Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993; Oliver, 2004), much less attention has 36 
been devoted to non-medical need. 37 
This paper considers how members of the UK general public value equal access to a mental health 38 
service where some service users have additional, defined non-medical needs.  To the best of our 39 
knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to elicit public preferences regarding possible aversion to 40 
unequal access to health care services. 41 
1.2 Conceptual framework 42 
To explore public preferences regarding access to health care, this work builds on research 43 
methodology from the existing consequentialist literature that captures the distributional preferences in 44 
health outcomes (Abásolo & Tsuchiya, 2004; 2013; Dolan & Tsuchiya, 2009).  One distributional preference 45 
ｷゲ さ;┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏW;ﾐゲ デｴ;デ ｷa ; ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ﾉW┗Wﾉ of total good is distributed unequally, then 46 
there is another distribution that is equally good as the first which distributes a smaller level of total good 47 
ﾏﾗヴW Wケ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ふAデﾆｷﾐゲﾗﾐが ヱΓΑヰぶく  AﾐﾗデｴWヴ SｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIW ｷゲ さゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴ┞ざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏW;ﾐゲ デｴ;デ if 48 
ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW reshuffled, this should have no impact on the resulting social welfare. 49 
Imagine two homogeneous groups X and Y, of equal size, that have the same levels of medical 50 
need: group X has no other need(s), while group Y has additional non-medical need(s).  If non-medical 51 
needs are not relevant to the decision-maker, then X and Y are interchangeable, so that horizontal equity 52 
4 
 
(equal treatment of equals) requires that groups X and Y be treated equally (equal access for equal medical 53 
need): we refer to this as symmetry.  If non-medical needs are also relevant, then X and Y are not 54 
interchangeable, so that vertical equity (unequal treatment of unequals) requires that group Y be given 55 
priority over group X (unequal access for unequal overall, medical plus non-medical, need): we refer to this 56 
as asymmetry. 57 
Thus, this study applies the above framework to examine whether people support aversion to 58 
unequal access to health care, and whether they support asymmetric access to health care when one party 59 
has additional non-medical needs.  To illustrate, Figure 1(a) is an abstract representation of levels of access 60 
to services, where the horizontal and vertical axes represent the level of access for groups X and Y, 61 
respectively.  Point E represents a situation where both groups have some equal level of access.  Point 1 62 
represents a situation where the total level of access across the two groups is the same as at point E, but 63 
group Y has better access than group X.  The three downward sloping lines represent different social 64 
welfare contours through point E, and illustrate that a symmetric social welfare contour needs to be 65 
inequality seeking in terms of access (s) if point 1 is to be preferred to point E.  Figure 1(b) represents two 66 
social welfare contours that are asymmetric regarding access in favour of group Y.  This illustrates that if 67 
the contours are asymmetric, point 1 can be ranked above point E, regardless of attitudes to inequality 68 
(unless strongly inequality averse to cancel out the asymmetry).  Thus, in this space さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ 69 
medical ﾐWWSざ ｷﾏヮﾉｷWゲ ; ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ;ﾐS ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ;┗WヴゲW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ┘Wﾉa;ヴW Iﾗﾐデﾗ┌ヴが ┘ｴｷﾉW さ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ 70 
unequal medical and non-medical ﾐWWSざ ｷﾏヮﾉｷWゲ WｷデｴWヴ ふｷぶ ; ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ;ﾐS ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ゲWWﾆｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐデﾗ┌ヴ ﾗヴ ふii) 71 
an asymmetric contour in favour of those with additional needs.  The last two contours may both rank 72 
point 1 above point E, but their ranking of point 2 (where levels of access of groups X and Y at point 1 are 73 
swapped) will disagree: (i) a symmetric and inequality seeking contour will rank points 1 and 2 equally 74 
better than point E; while (ii) an asymmetric contour in favour of those with additional needs will rank point 75 
1 above 2. 76 
1.3 Aims of the paper 77 
To operationalise this, we use access to cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), and a hypothetical 78 
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policy programme that, amongst those waiting to receive CBT, identifies those who are also unemployed in 79 
order to fast-track their access ahead of those who are in employment.  Thus, group X consists of those 80 
who are seeking CBT, but have no other apparent needs, while group Y consists of those who have the 81 
same medical needs as those in group X, but who are also unemployed.  There are three main possibilities.  82 
Ia デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデゲ さWケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざ デﾗ ﾏW;ﾐ ﾏWSical need only, then the hypothetical policy would be 83 
rejected in favour of equal access regardless of employment status に デｴｷゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW さゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ 84 
;┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐざく  Oﾐ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ｴ;ﾐSが ｷa デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデゲ さWケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざ デﾗ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ┘ｷSWヴ ﾐﾗﾐ-medical need, 85 
then it may be acceptable to give the unemployed better access to CBT に ｷﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ ┘ﾗヴSゲが さ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴ┞ ｷﾐ 86 
a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WSざく  Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI ﾏ;┞ ヮヴWaWヴ ｷﾐゲデW;S デﾗ ｪｷ┗W ｴｷｪｴWヴ ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ デﾗ デｴﾗゲW ｴﾗﾉSｷﾐｪ 87 
down a job despite similar mental health difficulties に ┗ｷ┣く さ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴ┞ ｷﾐ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WSざく   88 
Thus, this paper reports on an attempt to elicit public preferences for equal access to CBT by 89 
employment status.  There are three research questions: 90 
1. Are public preferences regarding access to CBT symmetric and inequality averse? 91 
2. Are public preferences regarding access to CBT asymmetric across employment groups? 92 
- And if so, is it asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, or in favour of the employed? 93 
3. Which respondent characteristics are predictive of different public preferences in this domain? 94 
The study elicits public or societal preferences regarding access to health care by asking respondents to 95 
make judgements across alternative policies based on what they regard is best for society, as opposed to 96 
which policy would personally benefit them most (Tsuchiya & Watson, 2017).  The study conducts an online 97 
survey of the UK public, where the main decision tasks are designed to distinguish between the relevant 98 
public preferences. 99 
Method 100 
2.1 The online questionnaire 101 
2.1.1 Introduction to the survey and practice tasks 102 
The survey was developed through a pilot phase with ten non-academic staff recruited at the 103 
University of Sheffield (mean age = 44.4 years, SD age = 11.0 years, 50/50 gender split) in December 2016.  104 
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These participants completed the survey on a range of devices (laptop, tablet, and smartphones) in the 105 
presence of a researcher, followed by a 30-minute interview about the topic.  They were invited to 106 
comment on their understanding of the survey and its adequacy for the research purposes.  Several 107 
changes were made in light of this pilot work, including revisions to the graphical aids, revisions to survey 108 
questions, and the survey being made unavailable for completion on smartphone devices, due to legibility 109 
of the graphical aids.       110 
At the start of the survey, participants were given some background information on the known 111 
relationship between mental health and unemployment and that anybody may become unemployed 112 
through no fault of their own.  Following a brief description on the effectiveness of CBT, participants were 113 
asked to imagine they were being consulted by the government on decisions to allocate extra funds for the 114 
provision of CBT, which could not be used for anything else.  They were introduced to the idea of the 115 
government helping the unemployed by giving them access to CBT through reduced waiting times from 116 
referral to treatment, and told about the various policy options that they could demonstrate a preference 117 
for in this survey: viz. either to benefit the employed and unemployed equally, or to target the support at 118 
either the unemployed or employed groups unequally.  The two groups were described as follows: 119 
- The employed: さ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ ;ｪW ;S┌ﾉデゲ ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴW ｷﾐ-work, are not claiming any unemployment benefits, and 120 
ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ Sｷ;ｪﾐﾗゲWS ┘ｷデｴ ; Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ デｴ;デ ｷゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷ┗W デﾗ CBTざく   121 
- The unemployed: さ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ ;ｪW ;S┌ﾉデゲ ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐ-work, are claiming unemployment benefits, and 122 
have been diagnosed with a common mental health problem that is responsive to CBT. Due to their 123 
diagnosis they are identified as at-risk for long-デWヴﾏ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ふﾗa ヱヲ ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲ ﾗヴ ﾏﾗヴWぶざく   124 
Participants were told that there were no right or wrong answers, and that the questions were not 125 
about which policy would benefit them more, but about what kind of public services they thought the 126 
government ought to provide (the full instructions given to participants are provided in the online 127 
Supplement [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE C]).   128 
For simplicity, participants were asked to assume for the purpose of this survey that the two groups 129 
were equal in size, and that the two programmes cost the same.  With a graphical aid, participants were 130 
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presented with sequential decision tasks between two policy options (i.e., Option A and Option B) that 131 
differed in the reduction (in weeks) in waiting time for CBT for each group from a common baseline.  In 132 
each task, participants were asked to choose whether they preferred Option A, Option B, or if they thought 133 
Option A and Option B were equally good.  Upon selecting an option, participants were given real-time 134 
feedback on-screen that quantified what their choice meant for CBT waiting times for the employed and 135 
unemployed groups.  They were then asked to confirm their choice, before moving on to the next task.   136 
Two practice questions featuring graphical aids with additional annotations (see Figure 2) preceded the 137 
actual tasks.  138 
2.1.2 The main tasks 139 
An overview of the structure of the main tasks is in Figure 3.  Following the practice questions, 140 
participants were provided with two different baseline frames in waiting times for CBT of 6 and 18 weeks.  141 
These were taken from the latest UK NHS Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) published 142 
targets of (i) 75% people to begin treatment within 6 weeks of referral, and (ii) 95% within 18 weeks (NHS 143 
England, 2015b).  To control for ordering/learning effects across the baseline frames, half the participants 144 
were given the 6-week frame first followed by the 18-week frame, and half were given the opposite.    145 
Within each frame, participants completed between three and four decision-making tasks, 146 
following different dynamic piping (or routing) depending on their answers.  The piping was designed to 147 
identify social preferences at the individual respondent level.  Figure 4 (not shown to respondents) 148 
illustrates the set of options used in the 6-week frame: the number of weeks of wait for the employed 149 
group is plotted along the horizontal axis, and for the unemployed group along the vertical axis.  Assuming 150 
waiting to access CBT is undesirable, the best situation is no wait, which is the top right hand corner (0,0).  151 
The baseline wait, in this case 6 weeks for both groups, is the bottom left hand corner (-6,-6).  Throughout, 152 
Option A always entailed a reduction of 3 weeks for both groups: A (-3,-3).    153 
Each frame had two modules: in the first module, represented by blue circles, Option B always 154 
involved a reduction of 2 weeks for the employed group, and varied the reduction to the unemployed 155 
group between 3 and 5 weeks; and in the second module, represented by green circles, Option B always 156 
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involved a reduction of 2 weeks for the unemployed group and varied the reduction to the employed 157 
groups between 4 and 5 weeks.  (The same set of absolute reductions in waiting times across decision tasks 158 
was used for the 18-week frame.)  The aim is to identify (or at least, narrow down) for each respondent the 159 
shape of the social welfare indifference curve through point A.  For example, a respondent indifferent 160 
between A and B11 and between A and B23 has an inequality averse and symmetric social preference.  In 161 
the first task in the first module, Option B involved reductions of 2 weeks for the employed and 4 weeks for 162 
the unemployed (B12).  Thus, the two policies, A and B, were equal in terms of overall number of weeks of 163 
wait reduced, but differed in the distribution of reduction in waiting times (A reduced by equal amounts for 164 
both; B reduced more for the unemployed).  If the respondent preferred Option A, then Option B was made 165 
more attractive by increasing the reduction in waiting times for the unemployed (B11).  Alternatively, if the 166 
respondent preferred Option B, then Option B was made less attractive by reducing the reduction in 167 
waiting times for the unemployed (B13).  Once indifference is reached, or a maximum of two tasks per 168 
module were answered, the respondent moved on to the next module (B22), and then to the next frame.  169 
In total, there were 14 different pipings per frame (full details are available from authors on request). 170 
Finally, participants from the main launch (see below) completed a catch task that was designed to 171 
catch-out participants who may have been responding carelessly.  Participants completed a task where 172 
Option B (a reduction of 4 weeks for both groups) was clearly superior to Option A (a reduction of 3 weeks 173 
for both groups), either in a 6-week or 18-week framing, consistent with the last framing they had seen. 174 
2.1.3 Background measures 175 
The main tasks were followed by a series of background questions.  We also recorded information 176 
on the time taken to complete the survey, and the device used to complete the survey. 177 
Demographic/survey variablesく  WW IﾗﾉﾉWIデWS S;デ; ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ｪWﾐSWヴが ;ｪWが ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 178 
residence, employment status, and experiences in oneself and in family or close friends of: unemployment, 179 
mental health diagnoses, mental health treatment, and cognitive behavioural therapy.   180 
Attitudinal questions.  Ten questions were designed, based on pilot work, to probe the underlying 181 
attitudes of survey respondents towards mental health and unemployment on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 182 
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strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree).  The order these questions were presented to participants was 183 
randomised. 184 
Life satisfaction.  Four questions from the Understanding Society: UK Household Longitudinal Study 185 
ふUKHL“き Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ ﾗa EゲゲW┝が ヲヰヱヶぶ ┘WヴW ┌ゲWS デﾗ ;ゲゲWゲゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ゲWﾉa-reported satisfaction with their 186 
health, job (if applicable), household income, and life overall, on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not satisfied at 187 
all, 7 = completely satisfied).      188 
General healthく  OﾐW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW UKHL“ ┘;ゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ ;ゲゲWゲゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ 189 
of their health on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = excellent, 5 = poor).    190 
Psychological distress.  Psychological distress was measured using the 6-item Kessler Psychological 191 
Distress Scale (K6; Kessler et al, 2002) covering six symptoms of psychological distress (nervousness, 192 
hopelessness, depression, etc) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = all of the time, 5 = none of the time).         193 
Disclosure question.  Participants from the full launch (see below) were explicitly asked at the end 194 
of the survey which of three non-mutually-exclusive statements described how they made their decisions in 195 
the main decision tasks (whether on the basis of what would benefit them personally; on what they 196 
thought the government ought to do; and/or as quickly and with as little effort as possible).  They were 197 
reassured that their participation or reward would not be affected by their answer to this question.   198 
2.2 The procedure 199 
Ethical approval was granted by the Department of Economics Ethics Sub-Committee at the 200 
University of Sheffield, in accordance with the University of Sheffield Research Ethics procedure prior to 201 
data collection (project reference number: 011967).  Following piloting, recruitment for the main survey 202 
was conducted using an online commercial survey panel, ResearchNow, in January 2017, with a target of 203 
1000 participants who reside and are eligible to vote in the UK.  The only quotas applied were a 50/50 204 
gender split, and a roughly equal distribution into three age-bands of: 18-35, 36-ヵヵが ;ﾐS д ヵヶ ┞W;ヴゲく   205 
Data collection had two phases.  In the first phase (or soft-launch) the data for 101 participants 206 
were collected and screened by the researchers.  The soft-launch participants gave their informed consent, 207 
before providing their age, gender, and the device they were completing the survey on (screening 208 
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questions).  Eligible participants then completed the main tasks before completing the background 209 
measures above, and questions about experience of unemployment, mental health diagnoses, treatment, 210 
and CBT in themselves and in somebody close to them.  Respondents who completed the whole survey in 211 
less than a third of the median time (as set by the survey company) were regarded as speeding and were 212 
excluded. 213 
In the second phase (or full survey), two changes were made as a result of screening the soft-214 
launch data, where Option A (equal split between the groups) was the modal response.  First, this modal 215 
preference for Option A may have reflected genuine preferences or a bias towards the left/first option.  In 216 
order to address this concern, the catch task described above was included.  Second, this modal preference 217 
for Option A may have represented the cognitively easiest strategy rather than a genuine preference.  In 218 
order to address concern, the disclosure question (see above) was added.  In both phases, participants who 219 
completed the survey were rewarded with a pre-set incentive from the online survey panel. 220 
2.3 Analyses 221 
2.3.1 The valid sample 222 
Respondents were excluded for the following reasons: failing the catch task, straight-lining the attitudinal 223 
questions (i.e. giving the same response to all questions), ;ﾐS ;Sﾏｷデデｷﾐｪ デﾗ ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ さ;ゲ ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞ 224 
;ﾐS ┘ｷデｴ ;ゲ ﾉｷデデﾉW Waaﾗヴデ ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWざく  TｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲWゲ are carried out using the remaining, valid sample.  225 
(For reference, all results of the full sample are reported in the online supplement [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE 226 
FILE B]). 2.3.2 Dependent variable: the nine categories of public preferences 227 
Of the 14 pipings (per frame), 11 allow categorising the responses with respect to the three 228 
inequality preferences (averse/neutral/seeking) and the three symmetry preferences (asymmetric in favour 229 
of the unemployed/symmetric/asymmetric in favour of the employed), resulting in nine possible mutually 230 
exclusive combinations (e.g. inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed), representing a 231 
particular type of social welfare indifference curve through point A.  Each respondent can be classified in 232 
only one category per frame. Due to the limited number of tasks asked in each frame to limit participant 233 
burden, three of the 11 ヮｷヮｷﾐｪゲ ┘WヴW デWﾐデ;デｷ┗W ふWくｪく さｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ;┗WヴゲW ;ﾐS possibly ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷIざぶが ;ﾐS W;Iｴ 234 
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of these was allocated to one of the nine categories based on judgement. 235 
To answer the first and second research questions on the nature of public preferences regarding 236 
access to CBT, frequencies of the responses are reported by these nine categories.  To answer the third 237 
research question concerning the individual characteristics that predict differences in public preferences, 238 
multinomial logit regressions were used to model the distribution of the preferences across the nine 239 
I;デWｪﾗヴｷWゲが ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa デｴW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデげゲ H;Iﾆｪヴﾗ┌ﾐS Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲ ;ﾐS ;デデｷデ┌SWゲく  “デ;ta v.15 (StataCorp) 240 
was used. 241 
2.3.3 Explanatory variables: individual level background characteristics 242 
To capture current employment status five dummy variables were used: student, job seeking, sick 243 
or disabled, retired; and not in the labour force.  This left the base as employed.  Broader experience of 244 
unemployment, either in the past or via friends and family, were also included as dummy variables.  245 
Personal experience of mental health difficulties was modelled via dummy variables for ever being 246 
diagnosed, or having friends or family who have ever been diagnosed, with a mental health problem.  247 
“┌HﾃWIデｷ┗W ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa デｴW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデげゲ ゲWﾉa-reported levels of general health and life satisfaction were re-248 
coded into three categories, with the base being the highest level of health or satisfaction.  Age, age 249 
squared and a dummy for belonging to one of the attitude clusters (see below) were also included. 250 
2.3.4 Explanatory variables: clustered attitudes 251 
In order to make sense of the ten item attitudinal responses, data from the valid sample were 252 
subjected to a two-step cluster analysis on SPSS v. 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA), whereby the optimal 253 
number of clusters was defined empirically (using the BIC), and then an algorithm determined which cluster 254 
a participant best fit into.  This produced two attitudinal clusters (see results).  A dummy variable for 255 
membership of cluster 2 was included in the multinomial regressions. 256 
2.3.5 Multinomial logit regression 257 
A multinomial logit specification was chosen to accommodate the categorical dependent variable 258 
with no natural ordering.  Following the results of a likelihood ratio test, the baseline analysis used 259 
observations from the 6-week and 18-week frames pooled (with a dummy to indicate the frame).  As the 260 
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errors were likely to be correlated at an individual level across the frames, the model was clustered by 261 
personal identification number. 262 
Results 263 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 264 
A デﾗデ;ﾉ ﾗa ヱヲヵヴ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ;デデWﾏヮデWS デｴW ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞く  Oa デｴWゲWが ヱヱヶ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ S;デ; ┘WヴW SWﾉWデWd as 265 
they failed to fully complete the survey.  There were an additional 38 who completed the survey but were 266 
not included in the sample either for speeding (n=34) or for possible duplication (n=4), resulting in 1000 267 
respondents in the full sample.  The mean age of the full sample was 45.81 years (SD = 15.07 years).  The 268 
majority (622) were in employment of some form; 814 had some experience of unemployment, either 269 
personally or through a family member or close friend; and 489 had either received, or had a family 270 
member or close friend who received, a diagnosis of a mental health problem.  Furthermore, 254 271 
participants had either received, or had a family member or close friend who received, CBT for a mental 272 
health problem.  See Table 1 for details. 273 
Of these, 662 constitute the valid sample. The breakdown of excluded respondents is: failing the 274 
catch task (n=321; see Supplemental Table 1 [INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 1 IN ONLINE FILE A]), 275 
straight-lining the attitudinal questions (n=3; Table 2) and admitデｷﾐｪ デﾗ ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ さ;ゲ ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞ 276 
;ﾐS ┘ｷデｴ ;ゲ ﾉｷデデﾉW Waaﾗヴデ ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWざ ふﾐЭヱヴき デ;HﾉW ヲぶく  TｴW ┗;ﾉｷS ゲ;ﾏヮﾉW ｴ;ゲ ; ｴｷｪｴWヴ ヮヴﾗヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴﾗゲW ;ｪWS 277 
ヵヶЩ ふー Э ヱくヱヱが ヮ Э くヰヲΑぶが デｴW ヴWデｷヴWS ふー Э ヰくΒΑが ヮ Э くヰΒンぶが ;ﾐS ﾉWゲゲ ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ふー Э ヰくΒンが ヮ Э くヰΓヵぶが 278 
compared to the full sample (see Table 1 に full results available from the authors).   279 
Table 2 illustrates that the valid sample may have slightly more left-wing attitudes than the full 280 
sample, and reported higher psychological distress (d = 0.09, p = .069), but were similar in self-reported 281 
health and life satisfaction.  Participants in the valid sample on average spent longer on the survey than the 282 
full sample, by 46 seconds (d = 0.08, p = .101).  Furthermore, more participants in the valid sample (67%) 283 
SWIﾉ;ヴWS デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ｴ;S ;ﾐゲ┘WヴWS デｴW ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ さ┘ｴ;デ ぷデｴW┞へ デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ Sﾗざが 284 
;ゲ ヮWヴ デｴW ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐゲが デｴ;ﾐ デｴW a┌ﾉﾉ ゲ;ﾏヮﾉW ふヵヶХが ー Э ヲくヰンが ヮ а くヰヰヱぶく   285 
In the cluster analysis, two clusters emerged as optimal for the valid sample data.  The first (cluster 286 
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1) was more populous (n=432) and tended towards the right wing spectrum, with more agreement with 287 
ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ さTｴﾗゲW ｷﾐ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ;ﾐS ヮ;┞ｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ざ ;ﾐS 288 
さUﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ｷﾐ デｴW UK ;ヴW デﾗﾗ ｴｷｪｴ ;ﾐS SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW ヮWﾗヮﾉW aヴﾗﾏ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾃﾗHゲざく  TｴW ゲWIﾗﾐS 289 
(cluster 2) tended towards the more left-wing spectrum, with more agreement with statements such as 290 
さAﾐ┞ﾗﾐW I;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾉﾗﾐｪ-デWヴﾏ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ﾐﾗ a;┌ﾉデ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ﾗ┘ﾐざ ;ﾐS さTｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ 291 
ｴ;ゲ ; ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ｴWﾉヮ W┗Wヴ┞ﾗﾐW aｷﾐS ; ﾃﾗH ┘ｴﾗ ┘;ﾐデゲ ﾗﾐWざく  ふ“WW Supplemental Table 3 for details 292 
[INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3 IN ONLINE FILE A]).   293 
3.2 The main results 294 
Table 3 shows the distribution of observations across the nine preference categories of inequality 295 
aversion and symmetry, for the valid pooled sample.  One hundred and sixty observations in the 6-week 296 
frame and 155 observations in the 18-week frame were not able to be categorised (see Supplemental Table 297 
2 [INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 2 IN ONLINE FILE A]).  Only a single observation (in the 6-week 298 
frame) fell in category seven: this observation was therefore dropped for the multinomial logit model. 299 
3.2.1 Are stated public preferences averse to inequality in access to the service? 300 
Most observations (774, 76.7%) demonstrated a degree of inequality aversion, with a smaller 301 
amount (218, 21.6%) demonstrating inequality seeking, and a negligible proportion categorised as 302 
inequality neutral (17, 1.7%).   303 
3.2.2 Are stated public preferences symmetric across employment groups? 304 
The majority of observations (531, 52.6%) were classified as asymmetric in favour of the 305 
unemployed, with a smaller amount categorised as symmetric (411, 40.7%), and a few responses as 306 
asymmetric in favour of the employed (67, 6.6%).  The modal response overall was one of symmetric 307 
inequality aversion (393, 38.9%).    308 
3.2.3 What respondent characteristics predict differences in public preferences?  309 
The results of the multinomial logit model are displayed in Table 4.  All estimates demonstrate 310 
SW┗ｷ;デｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW H;ゲWﾉｷﾐW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ﾗa さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざ ふﾗヴ ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ;┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐぶく  311 
There was a positive effect of age squared on being inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the 312 
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unemployed (b = 0.001, p < .05). When combined with the age coefficient this indicates that participants 313 
beyond middle age were increasingly less unlikely to fall in this category than symmetric inequality 314 
aversion, although age does not appear in general to be highly predictive of preferences.    315 
Students were less likely to be inequality neutral and symmetric (b = Ъ14.612, p < .001). Jobseekers 316 
were: more likely to be inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed (b = 0.972, p < .05); 317 
less likely to be inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the employed (b Э Ъ14.393, p < .001); and 318 
more likely to be inequality seeking, either in favour of the unemployed (b = 1.556, p < .01) or in favour of 319 
the employed (b = 2.076, p < .05).  People who were off work due to disability or sickness were more likely 320 
to be inequality neutral than inequality averse and symmetric (b = 2.031, p < .05). This group were also less 321 
likely to be inequality seeking and in favour of the employed (b Э Ъ13.576, p < .001), as were those who 322 
reported not being in the labour force (b Э Ъヱヴく991, p < .001). 323 
People with the lowest level of life satisfaction were more likely to demonstrate inequality aversion 324 
and symmetry in favour of the unemployed than inequality aversion and symmetry (b = 0.617, p < .05), as 325 
were those with the worst level of general health (b Э Ъヰく689, p < .05).  Finally, people who endorsed 326 
attitudes tending towards the left-wing were less likely to be asymmetric in favour of the employed (b = 327 
Ъ0.759, p < .05), or inequality neutral and symmetric (b Э ЪヱくΒ40, p < .05) than inequality averse and 328 
symmetric. 329 
Discussion and conclusion 330 
Aﾐ Wケ┌ｷデ┞ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW ﾗa デｴW NH“ ｷゲ さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざく  Tｴｷゲ ヮ;ヮWヴ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS ┘ｴWデｴWヴ 331 
members of the ヮ┌HﾉｷI ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ さﾐWWSざ, to access a health care service, as solely medical need, or 332 
also allow for non-medical need.  Health economists have long debated the relative merits of access versus 333 
outcomes in health policy.  Targeting equal access has been criticised by consequentialists who regard 334 
access as a means to an end, in this case, health (Culyer & Wagastaff, 1993).  Depending on the baseline 335 
distribution of health and capacities to benefit, achieving equal health outcomes would require unequal 336 
access to (and use of) services and support.  In this respect, the current survey goes further: the 337 
hypothetical intervention proposes unequal access to health care despite equal medical need, because the 338 
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parties have unequal non-medical need.  339 
The first research question explored whether public preferences regarding access to CBT were 340 
IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW ﾗa さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ medical ﾐWWSざ H┌デ ﾐﾗデ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ﾐWWS 341 
(symmetric and inequality averse with respect to access).  This was indeed the modal response (38.9%) 342 
across the possible preference categories.   The modal preference here suggests a concern for equality 343 
(three quarters of observations were averse to unequal access), but for most, this concern is blind to non-344 
health needs such as unemployment.  345 
One possibility is that participants were refusing to treat access to health care as a means to 346 
address non-health needs.  In addition, several alternative interpretations are possible.  For example, 347 
participants might, in principle, consider some non-health needs in determining access to health care, but 348 
may not have placed a high enough value on unemployment to warrant supporting unequal access to the 349 
mental health service under our scenarios.  It is conceivable that participants viewed holding down a job 350 
with a mental health problem as an equal or greater challenge than being unemployed with a mental 351 
health problem (e.g. Nystuen, Hagen, & Herrin, 2001).  The attitudinal responses differed regarding 352 
whether the unemployed (vs. the employed) should get extra help from the government, with the more 353 
populous (and right-wing) cluster disagreeing.  Additional work could investigate whether the same pattern 354 
of responses is observed when comparing health needs with alternative (but often related) non-health 355 
needs, such as escaping debt or socioeconomic deprivation. 356 
TｴW ゲWIﾗﾐS ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘;ゲ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ regarding access to health 357 
care were asymmetric in favour of the unemployed or the employed.  When the two groups were given the 358 
same priority, we referred to it as symmetry, and when the two groups are given different priorities, we 359 
referred to this as asymmetry.  While symmetric and inequality averse preferences was the modal 360 
response, the majority (61.1%) of observations deviated from this.  The second most populous category 361 
was asymmetric in favour of the unemployed (32.4%), followed by inequality seeking and in favour of the 362 
unemployed (20.2%).  Thus, where preferences deviated from symmetry by employment status, support to 363 
access CBT was greater for the unemployed than employed group.  This is generally consistent with the 364 
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observed attitudinal responses, where even the right wing cluster tended to agree rather than disagree 365 
┘ｷデｴ ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾉｷﾆW さ; ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ｷデ SｷaaｷI┌ﾉデ aﾗヴ ゲﾗﾏWﾗﾐW デﾗ ｪWデ ; ﾃﾗHざく  Iデ ｷゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ 366 
consistent with other UK surveys of the general population, which suggest people generally tend to view 367 
unemployment as a negative experience (e.g. Ipsos MORI, 2009).            368 
It is conceivable, therefore, that a majority of the sample could be moved to support preferential 369 
access to mental health care for the unemployed, depending on the circumstances.  For example, if the 370 
benefit to the unemployed was large enough and/or the resources were ring-fenced in such a way that they 371 
could only be used to benefit one party more than the other.  Complex situations such as this may occur in 372 
practice, since the numbers of employed and unemployed people with long-term common mental health 373 
problems are, in reality, unequal (TUC, 2017).  While the complexities and online administration of this 374 
survey necessitated simplified assumptions, further empirical work in this area that explores varying the 375 
proportion of employed and unemployed people would be of interest.    376 
A related point is whether participants actually assumed all other things (aside from employment 377 
status) were the same across the two groups in the scenarios.  There were a number of things that are 378 
implicitly assumed to be the same for both groups, but were not explicitly stated so.  For example, we did 379 
not say the health effect of treatment was the same for the unemployed and employed.  Nor did we say 380 
that the number of unemployed who can return to work by being treated was the same as the number of 381 
employed who can remain in work by being treated.  We did not explicitly rule out the possibility that those 382 
who were unemployed might have a more severe mental health difficulty than those who remained in 383 
employment.  There are practical limitations to the additional considerations and interpretations that a 384 
survey can explicitly rule out, and those that were brought up at the pilots have been addressed.  However, 385 
there remains the possibility that not all respondents interpreted the two groups to be identical, except 386 
from employment status, and if so, the proportion of respondents with symmetric preferences regarding 387 
access would be overestimated.  388 
Of particular interest is the role of individual responsibility.  Respondents in the more populous 389 
right wing ;デデｷデ┌Sｷﾐ;ﾉ Iﾉ┌ゲデWヴ ┘WヴW ﾉWゲゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ;ｪヴWW デｴ;デ さ;ﾐ┞ﾗﾐW I;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾉﾗﾐｪ-term 390 
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┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ﾐﾗ a;┌ﾉデ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ﾗ┘ﾐざく  Ia ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ┗ｷW┘WS デｴW ﾉﾗﾐｪ-term unemployed as 391 
responsible for their own situation, then it may be deemed reasonable to reject unequal access in favour of 392 
the unemployed, not because health care resources should only be used for health benefits, but because 393 
the two groups are not equal: under this reasoning, the unemployed might be needier, but they would also 394 
be blameworthy.  The perception of personal responsibility may also lead to preferential support for the 395 
employed (at the expense of the unemployed).  A possible extension of this work could incorporate 396 
(perceived) responsibility and effectiveness of CBT in improving both mental health and (re)employability.  397 
The final research question explored the ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ characteristics that were related to their 398 
ゲデ;デWS ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲく  TｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ; ゲｴｷaデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉﾗ┌ゲ H;ゲWﾉｷﾐW ふﾗa さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ medical 399 
ﾐWWSざぶ towards being inequality averse or seeking and having asymmetric preferences in favour of the 400 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ふｷﾏヮﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ さ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ overall ﾐWWSざぶく  TｴW ﾏ┌ﾉデｷﾐﾗﾏｷ;ﾉ ﾉﾗｪｷデ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS 401 
that current experience (or employment status) mattered: those who were currently job-seeking were 402 
generally more likely to demonstrate preferences that favoured the unemployed (with some heterogeneity 403 
favouring support for the employed in the 13 observations falling in category 9), and those who were 404 
currently unemployed on disability or sickness grounds, or not in the labour force, were less likely to be 405 
inequality averse with asymmetric preferences in favour of the employed, compared to those currently 406 
working.  While these effects may be partly driven by respondents answering the question based on what 407 
would benefit them personally, the majority of the valid sample (66.5%) reported answering the questions 408 
さH;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ┘ｴ;デ I デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ Sﾗざが ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ デｴWゲW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSWﾐデゲ ┘WヴW ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ 409 
aware that the questions were asking for their societal preferences.  Elsewhere, experience of 410 
unemployment has been found to be a significant determinant of public preferences for welfare state 411 
policies relating to the unemployed (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Neumann, Buss & Bahr, 2016).     412 
Having a history of unemployment had no significant effect on stated preferences.  This is 413 
consistent with the wider economics literature that suggests that observed individual decision-making and 414 
preferences can be influenced by state (or in-the-moment) factors, and that we tend to be present-biased 415 
┘ｴWﾐ ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ SｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷ┗W SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ふWくｪく FヴWSWヴｷIﾆが LﾗW┘WﾐゲデWｷﾐが わ OげSﾗﾐﾗｪｴ┌Wが ヲヰヰヲき LﾗW┘WﾐゲデWｷﾐが ヲヰヰヰぶく  416 
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It may also reflect the fact that those that were job-seeking but have since found re-employment prefer 417 
that people in these two groups should be treated equivalently.  Most employed people are confident that 418 
they would be able to find work within 12 months if they were made unemployed (Ipsos MORI, 2009).  419 
Having a history ﾗa ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｷﾉﾉﾐWゲゲ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデﾉ┞ ;aaWIデ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲく   420 
People who reported being in the best (vs. worst) state of health, and those who reported having 421 
the worst (vs. best) life satisfaction were more likely to be inequality averse and have asymmetric 422 
preferences in support of the unemployed (vs. the symmetric baseline).  Dissatisfaction with life may reflect 423 
discontent with the status quo, and a preference for more social support for marginalised groups, such as 424 
the unemployed.  It is conceivable that those in the best health may perceive themselves as less needing of 425 
the health service (rather than upholding the belief that mental health problems can happen to anyone), 426 
and thus may perceive themselves in a more favourable position to show preferences that support a 427 
particular social group (rather than equal access for all).  Finally, those endorsing more left-wing attitudes 428 
were also less likely to demonstrate asymmetry in favour of the employed. This suggests that the 429 
preferences observed may be reflective of a wider world-view that the long-term unemployed need extra 430 
help from the government. 431 
Policy makers may be interested that although the aversion to inequality outweighed any 432 
preference toward the unemployed, the majority did consider employment status in their allocation 433 
decisions.  In the valid pooled sample 531 observations were asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, 67 434 
asymmetric in favour of the employed and only 411 symmetric between the two groups.  This supports a 435 
conceptualisation of equity for health care allocation which is broader than equal access for equal medical 436 
need. Methods which attempt to operationalise this include, but are not limited to, multi-criteria decision 437 
making, explicit equity weighting and the use of inequality indexes such as Atkinson or Gini.  Secondly, 438 
policy support is dependent on in-state situation; logically one would expect support for policies for 439 
unemployment to increase in times of recession, whereas gaining support for a pro unemployed policy 440 
during a period of low unemployment may present more of a challenge.   441 
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Some limitations of the current data need to be acknowledged.  First, the findings should be 442 
thought of as indicative rather than representative of the wider UK populationげゲ ┗ｷW┘ゲく  While preferences 443 
from a breadth of participants have been collected, the valid sample statistically significantly deviates from 444 
the projected characteristics of the UK population in terms of gender, and the full sample in terms of age 445 
(see Supplemental Table 4 [INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 4 IN ONLINE FILE A]).  However, it 446 
should also be noted that respondent gender and age were not strong predictors of the preferences.  447 
Second, coefficient estimates should be treated with caution as results were sensitive to model 448 
specification and some of the categories in the multinomial model are based on a small number of 449 
observations, thus may be unstable.  Another point to note is that the way the policy is framed may have a 450 
systematic effect on responses, and this is an interesting empirical question that was not explored in the 451 
current research. Instead, all participants were given the same prior information (see the online 452 
supplement [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE C]). 453 
Beyond policy implications, the research also has a clear methodological implication that should be 454 
borne in mind when designing future survey studies using online panels. In particular, the large proportion 455 
of participants that were excluded from the valid sample as a result of failing a data quality check should be 456 
noted.  While having the ability to screen out participants who potentially provided a lower-quality 457 
response should be seen as a strength of the research, such a large exclusion rate does raise questions 458 
about data quality per se using online panels to assess stated preferences.  A recommendation would be 459 
for researchers to collect additional data above their target sample size to account for potential poor 460 
quality data, and based on the current study, this figure may be as high as 30%.   461 
To conclude, the study has developed an online survey of the UK general public to elicit their stated 462 
ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ デﾗ W┝;ﾏｷﾐW ｴﾗ┘ デｴW┞ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ デｴW さWケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざ ｷﾐ さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾐWWSざが ┌ゲｷﾐｪ 463 
access to CBT as an example, and employment status as an additional non-medical need.  The study found 464 
デｴ;デ デｴW デｴヴWW ﾏ;ｷﾐ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIW I;デWｪﾗヴｷWゲ ┘WヴWぎ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ;┗WヴゲW ;ﾐS ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ふｷﾏヮﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ さWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ 465 
aﾗヴ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾏWSｷI;ﾉ ﾐWWSざぶが ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ;┗WヴゲW ;ﾐS ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ｷﾐ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ふｷﾏヮﾉ┞ｷﾐg 466 
さ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ﾐWWSざぶが ;ﾐS ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ゲWWﾆｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ｷﾐ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW 467 
20 
 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ふIﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ さ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ;IIWゲゲ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐWケ┌;ﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ﾐWWSざぶが ┘ｷデｴ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ HWｷﾐｪ デｴW 468 
largest.  The most preferred use of additional resources in our hypothetical scenarios was to spread it out 469 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 509 












Variable n % n % n % n % 
Gender 1000 100 662 100 502 100 507 100 
 Male 500 50 334 50.5 261 52.0 255 50.3 
 Female 500 50 328 49.5 241 48.0 252 49.7 
         
Age 1000 100 662 100 502 100 507 100 
 Aged 18-35 327 32.7 190 28.7 154 30.7 156 30.8 
 Aged 36-55 364 36.4 232 35.0 158 31.5 166 32.7 
 Aged ≥ 56 309 30.9 240 36.3 190 37.8 186 36.5 
         
Employment status 1000 100 662 100 502 100 507 100 
 Employed 622 62.2 390 58.9 278 55.4 287 56.6 
 Student/training 37 3.7 24 3.6 22 4.4 21 4.1 
 Unemployed (job-seeking) 55 5.5 33 5.0 30 6.0 30 5.9 
 Unemployed (disability/sickness) 58 5.8 34 5.1 23 4.6 28 5.5 
 Retired 186 18.6 147 22.2 121 24.1 116 22.9 
 Not in the labour market 42 4.2 34 5.1 28 5.6 25 4.9 
         
Ever job-seeking 603 60.3 418 63.1 323 64.3 322 63.5 
Friends/family ever job-seeking 742 74.2 501 75.7 380 75.7 383 75.5 
         
Ever diagnosed with a mental health problem 239 23.9 168 25.4 131 26.1 129 25.4 
Friends/family ever diagnosed with a mental 
health problem 
417 41.7 296 44.7 225 44.8 219 43.2 
         
Life satisfaction [1-7 Likert, 7=completely 
satisfied] 
        
1 Life satisfaction (6, 7) 416 41.6 279 42.2 213 42.4 211 41.6 
2 Life satisfaction (5) 283 28.3 190 28.7 141 28.1 148 29.2 
3 Life satisfaction (1, 2, 3, 4) 301 30.1 193 29.2 148 29.5 148 29.2 
         
General health [1-5 Likert, 1=excellent]         
1 General health (1, 2) 463 46.3 292 44.1 217 43.2 221 43.6 
2 General health (3) 317 31.7 215 32.4 163 32.5 165 32.5 
3 General health (4, 5) 220 22 155 23.4 122 24.3 121 23.9 
         
Attitude cluster 1000 (1) 255 25.5 201 30.4 162 32.3 159 31.4 
Attitude cluster 1000 (2) 479 47.9 321 48.5 238 47.4 244 48.1 
Attitude cluster 1000 (3) 266 26.6 140 21.1 102 20.3 104 20.5 
         
Attitude cluster 662 (1) - - 432 65.3 315 62.7 325 64.1 
Attitude cluster 662 (2) - - 230 34.7 187 37.3 182 35.9 
Note. Subset of the valid sample providing observations that are able to be categorised for both inequality preferences and symmetry 511 
preferences in a given frame. Attitudinal cluster 1000 uses the full sample. Attitudinal sample 662 uses the valid sample. 512 
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Table 2. Attitudinal and background questions 513 
 Full sample 
(N=1000) 
 Valid sample 
(N=662) 
 
Variable M SD  M SD  
Time to complete (minutes) 10.47 8.94  11.23 9.43  
       
Attitudinal questions [1-5] (1 = strongly agree)       
 Anyone can experience long-term unemployment through no 
 fault of their own 
1.86 0.93  1.80 0.92  
 A mental health problem makes it difficult for someone to get 
 a job 
1.89 0.82  1.80 0.78  
 In my view, CBT does not work for common mental health 
 problems 
3.02 0.90  3.13 0.88  
 The long-term unemployed should do more to help 
 themselves 
2.44 1.01  2.46 1.01  
 Employers tend to discriminate against those with mental 
 health difficulties 
2.17 0.87  2.09 0.83  
 Mental health treatment should be prioritised based on 
 clinical considerations only 
2.36 0.95  2.36 0.96  
 The long-term unemployed need extra help from the 
 government 
2.31 1.02  2.25 1.00  
 Those in work and paying into the system should be given 
 priority 
2.90 1.14  3.02 1.16  
 Unemployment benefits in the UK are too high and 
 discourage people from finding jobs 
2.80 1.26  2.86 1.32  
 The government has a responsibility to help  everyone find a 
 job who wants one 
2.04 0.97  1.95 0.94  
       
Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K6) [6-30] 23.19 6.10  23.73 5.82  
       
Overall health [1-5] (1 = excellent) 2.75 1.06  2.79 1.04  
       
Satisfaction [1-7] (1 = not satisfied at all)       
 Health 4.99 1.45  4.99 1.43  
 Income 4.73 1.54  4.72 1.55  
 Job (0 = n/a; valid n = 658, 413)  4.90 1.41  4.90 1.39  
 Life overall  4.98 1.41  4.99 1.37  
 n %  n %  
Participant’s motivations (“I answered the decision tasks”) 899 89.9  561 84.7  
 (1) based on what would suit me best personally 321 35.7  152 27.1  
 (2) based on what I thought the government ought to do 500 55.6  373 66.5  
 (3) as quickly and with as little effort as possible 18 2  0 0.0  
 (1) and (2) 51 5.7  36 6.4  
(1) and (3) 2 0.2  0 0.0  
 (2) and (3) 2 0.2  0 0.0  
 (1) and (2) and (3) 5 0.6  0 0.0  
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Device survey completed on 1000 100  662 100  
 Tablet 81 8.1  53 8.0  
 Laptop 544 54.4  363 54.8  
 PC 375 37.5  246 37.2  
Note. Percentages for subcategories (indented) represent proportion of valid cases. Values in square brackets indicate potential scale 514 
range, when applicable. Probability estimates for Cohen’s d taken from t-tests of group means, which assume equal variance. 515 
 516 
Table 3: Observations distribution in the nine preference categories for the valid pooled sample 517 
 
Asymmetric in 
favour of the 
employed 
Asymmetric in 
favour of the 
unemployed 
Symmetric Total 
Inequality averse 54 327 393 774 
Inequality neutral 0 0 17 17 
Inequality seeking 13 204 1 218 
Total 67 531 411 1,009 
Note. This table shows the observations for the pooled data. A number of observations were not able to be classified for both 518 




Table 4: Multinomial logit results: valid pooled sample 521 
Multinomial logit results  2 3 4 8 9 
valid sample (obs=327) (obs=54) (obs=17) (obs=204) (obs=13) 
      
Male 0.100 0.016 1.199
ゆ










0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.001
ゆ
 -0.003 
      
Student -0.254 -0.292 -14.612*** -0.408 1.088 
Jobseeking 0.972* -14.393*** 0.886 1.556** 2.076* 
Sick or disabled 0.945
ゆ
 0.706 2.031* 0.607 -13.576*** 
Retired  -0.437 0.061 -1.516 -0.462 0.049 
Not in labour force 0.294 0.656 1.527
ゆ
 0.103 -14.990*** 
      





Friends/family ever job-seeking -0.086 -0.115 0.468 -0.073 0.798 
Ever diagnosed with mental illness -0.167 0.225 -0.171 -0.479 -1.125 
Friends/family ever diagnosed with 
mental illness 
-0.148 0.116 -0.452 -0.430
ゆ
 -0.056 
      
2 Life satisfaction 0.373 -0.670 -1.312 -0.084 -1.830 
3 Life satisfaction 0.617* 0.268 0.669 0.176 0.487 
      
2 General health -0.042 -0.198 0.593 0.224 0.569 
3 General health -0.689* -0.790
ゆ
 -0.367 -0.349 -0.565 
      
Attitude cluster 2 dummy 0.140 -0.759* -1.840* 0.173 -0.521 
      
18-week frame dummy 0.093 0.116 -0.432 0.063 1.208
ゆ
 
      
_cons 1.312 -5.580** -5.626* 1.073 -10.703* 
      
Observations = 1008, individuals = 570 
Category 1: (baseline, obs = 393) Inequality averse and symmetric; Category 2: Inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the 522 
unemployed; Category 3: Inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the employed; Category 4: Inequality neutral and 523 
symmetric; Category 8: Inequality seeking and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed; Category 9: Inequality seeking and 524 
asymmetric in favour of the employed; Categories 5 & 6 omitted as no observations, Category 7 omitted as only 1 observation. 525 
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 554 
Supplemental Table 1: The catch task 555 
 n (%) chose  time (secs) 
Decision task Option A Neither Option B  Median M SD 
        
Full sample (N = 899 of 1000) 
6-week catch question  
A (3, 3) | B (2, 2) 68 (15.1) 94 (20.9) 288 (64.0)  8.14 11.74 27.86 
18-week catch question        
A (15, 15) | B (14, 14)  65 (14.5) 94 (20.9) 290 (64.6)  7.63 11.66 22.81 
        
Valid sample (N = 662)        
6-week catch question         
A (3, 3) | B (2, 2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 279 (100.0)  9.43 12.85 25.51 
18-week catch question 
A (15, 15) | B (14, 14)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 282 (100.0)  9.52 14.15 33.84 
Note. Numbers in parentheses in left-hand column represent number of weeks’ wait in that task for the employed and unemployed, 556 














Preference group n %  n %  n % 
Asymmetric in favour of the employed 201 10.1  167 12.6  34 5 
Asymmetric in favour of the unemployed 153 7.7  140 10.6  13 1.9 
         
Inequality averse         
and asymmetric in favour of the employed 88 4.4  54 4.1  34 5 
and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed 368 18.4  263 19.9  105 15.5 
and possibly symmetric 596 29.8  392 29.6  204 30.2 
and symmetric 9 0.5  1 0.1  8 1.2 
and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, and violates  
monotonicity 
27 1.4  9 0.7  18 2.7 
and locally maximin, and asymmetric in favour of the 
unemployed 
219 11.0  55 4.2  164 24.3 
         
Inequality neutral & symmetric 27 1.4  17 1.3  10 1.5 
         
Inequality seeking 12 0.6  8 0.6  4 0.6 
and asymmetric in favour of the employed 22 1.1  13 1.0  9 1.3 
and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed 86 4.3  67 5.1  19 2.8 
and possibly symmetric 1 0.1  1 0.1  0 0 
and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, and violates 
monotonicity 
191 9.6  137 10.3  54 8.0 
Note. In this table preference groupings across the 6- and 18-week frames have been combined, so totals sum to N*2, and 561 
percentages are absolute values / N*2.  Percentages sum to greater than 100 due to rounding.  Bolded category indicates modal 562 





Supplemental Table 3: Mean (SD) agreement to the attitudinal statements, as a function of cluster 566 
 M (SD) 
Attitudinal questions [1-5] (1 = strongly agree) 
Cluster 1 
(n = 432) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 230) 

























































Supplemental Table 4: Comparison of sample age and gender distributions to UK ONS 2017 571 
projections 572 










ONS vs. valid 
sample 
ONS vs. full 
sample 
Gender   
Male 32595110 (49.3%) 334 (50.5%) 500 (50.0%) ぬ2(1) = 1390.8  
p < .001 
ぬ2(1) = 0.14  
p = .703 Female 33456386 (50.7%) 328 (49.5%) 500 (50.0%) 
Age   
18-35 15621995 (30.0%) 190 (28.7%) 327 (32.7%) 
ぬ2(2) = 0.68  
p = .712 
ぬ2(2) = 12.35  
p = .002 
36-55 17596286 (33.8%) 232 (35.0%) 364 (36.4%) 
56+ 18876744 (36.2%) 240 (36.3%) 309 (30.9%) 
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ONLINE FILE B: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS USING THE FULL SAMPLE 577 
The analyses were repeated for the full sample.  Observations were pooled across frames, allocated to the 578 
nine categories, and the multinomial logit model was applied.  The only difference from the valid sample 579 
model was that there were three attitudinal categories for the full sample. 580 
Across the two frames, a total of 1634 observations from the full sample were classified into one of the 581 
nine preference categories (see Supplemental Table 5).  A number of observations were not able to be 582 
classified for both symmetry and inequality. These totalled 189 observations in the 6-week frame and 177 583 
observations in the 18-week frame.  The modal preference (by a small margin) is inequality averse and 584 
asymmetric in favour of the unemployed, followed closely by inequality averse and symmetric.  The same 585 
three combinations have zero or one observation only, and therefore dropped from the regression analysis. 586 
The results of the multinomial logit model is reported in Supplemental Table 6.  Job-seeking remains the 587 
most significant factor explaining the divergence from the baseline (inequality averse and symmetric). 588 
 589 
 590 
Supplemental Table 5: Observations distribution in the nine preference categories for full sample 591 
 
Asymmetric in 
favour of the 
employed 
Asymmetric in 
favour of the 
unemployed 
Symmetric Total 
Inequality averse 88 614 605 1307 
Inequality neutral 0 0 27 27 
Inequality seeking 22 277 1 300 
Total 110 891 633 1,634 
Note. This table shows the observations for the pooled data. A number of observations were not able to be classified for both 592 





Supplemental Table 6: Multinomial logit results for full pooled sample 596 
Multinomial logit results  2 3 4 8 9 
full sample (obs=614) (obs=88) (obs=27) (obs=277) (obs=22) 
      
Male 0.173 0.017 0.694 0.131 0.541 
Age -0.077
*







 0.000 0.000 0.001
*
 0.002 
      
Student 0.159 -0.584 -13.599
***
 0.057 -0.317 
Jobseeking 1.061
**





Sick or disabled 0.629† 0.468 1.598
*
 0.515 0.791 
Retired  -0.441 -0.215 -1.369 -0.305 -1.288 





      
Ever job-seeking 0.131 0.448 0.049 0.462
*
 -0.242 
Friends/family ever job-seeking -0.015 -0.097 0.628 -0.282 0.436 
Ever diagnosed with mental illness -0.398
*
 -0.064 -0.818 -0.566
*
 -1.455 
Friends/family ever diagnosed with 
mental illness 
-0.229 -0.141 -0.121 -0.280 -0.178 
      
2 Life satisfaction 0.215 -0.522 -0.690 -0.073 -1.691
*
 
3 Life satisfaction 0.391† 0.310 0.313 -0.112 -0.229 
      
2 General health -0.022 -0.072 0.325 0.133 0.286 
3 General health -0.325 -0.722† -0.132 -0.095 0.188 
      
Attitude cluster 2 -0.053 0.637† 1.380 0.083 0.860 
Attitude cluster 3 0.347 0.640† 2.251
*
 -0.320 0.766 
      
18-week frame dummy 0.120 0.143 -0.212 0.057 0.416 
      
_cons 1.349 -2.043 -5.175 1.227 -0.618 
      
Observations = 1633, individuals = 896 
Category 1: (baseline, obs = 605) Inequality averse and symmetric; Category 2: Inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the 597 
unemployed; Category 3: Inequality averse and asymmetric in favour of the employed; Category 4: Inequality neutral and 598 
symmetric; Category 8: Inequality seeking and asymmetric in favour of the unemployed; Category 9: Inequality seeking and 599 
asymmetric in favour of the employed; Categories 5 & 6 omitted as no observations, Category 7 omitted as only 1 observation. 600 






ONLINE FILE C: SCREENSHOTS FROM THE ONLINE SURVEY 605 
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